

**STRATEGY
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CONSTABULARY TRAINING FOR A FULL-SPECTRUM FORCE

BY

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ABSTRACT

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Constabulary training must be a mainstay of today's full-spectrum force. This paper explores the question—why does the United States Army continue to focus training efforts solely on the two major theaters of war scenario when peace operations are more likely? Constabulary training should be appropriately imbedded in the basic level courses of professional military training. This paper provides a historical perspective on previous constabulary missions and a comparison of how constabulary-type training suits today's peace operations. The experiences of two diversely prepared units, the 793d Military Police Battalion and Task Force 3-504, that deployed in support of Operation Hawk in Kosovo are included. Finally, a prescription to alleviate frustration for the war fighter who must keep the peace is also provided.

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CONSTABULARY TRAINING FOR A FULL-SPECTRUM FORCE

A soldier who enlists in the United States Army today can expect to serve 20 years and deploy in support of one or more peacekeeping or humanitarian operation in support of our national security interests, yet never fight in a major theater of war. If that is the case, why are today's force structure, training, and equipment focused on a scenario of two nearly simultaneous major theaters of war? Today's legacy force, and to some degree the interim force designed for the near term future, is still trained and equipped to fight major theater wars.¹ Yet our military, trained for war, is often called to respond to contingencies such as peacekeeping, for which they are less than optimally equipped and trained. Consequently, elements of divisional and corps war-fighting units best suited and trained for peacekeeping and humanitarian operations such as military police, civil affairs, psychological operations units are over-deployed and often undermanned.

Army involvement in peace operations has increased considerably since World War II. Active military peace operations are conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain peace.

"We have seen and we will continue to see a wide range of ambiguous threats in the shadow area between major war and millennial peace. Americans must understand...that a number of small challenges, year after year, can add up to a more serious challenge to our interests. The time to act, to help our friends by addition our strength to the equation, is not when the threat is at our doorstep, when the stakes are highest and the needed resources enormous."²

The peace operations in which U.S. forces have been engaged are a form of military operations other than war (MOOTW). U.S. peace operations doctrine encompasses peacekeeping operations (PKO) and peace enforcement operations (PEO). While considerably different in some respects, soldiers participating in either of these operations must be aware of local and international perceptions and must deal with complicated and refined rules of engagement which define their use of force. These are critical elements in peace operations. Failure to fully know them or to respond accordingly could result in negative strategic consequences.

Perhaps the most critical function in most current peace operations is the establishment of "rule of law" in which the conduct of constabulary operations are critical. The rule of law ensures indigenous criminal justice systems (the judicial system, law enforcement, the penal system, and the law code), are well-established so that criminal or corrupt elements don't resume the conflict or impede the re-establishment of civil affairs.³ In many cases, indigenous

police forces cannot provide for the public security when peacekeepers arrive. However, “indigenous law enforcement and criminal justice systems are necessary for a society to achieve and maintain durable peace.”⁴ In the interim, while indigenous law enforcement and criminal justice systems are being developed, the military fills the public safety vacuum created by the dissolution of the indigenous law enforcement. In order to keep the peace, soldiers find themselves taking measures to ensure a level of public safety by intervening to stop civil violence, such as vigilante lynchings; by stopping and deterring looting, vandalism, or other violent public crimes; and by dispersing unruly or violent public demonstrations and civil disturbances.⁵ These are constabulary activities.

The term constabulary in current U.S. usage refers to “a force organized along military lines, providing basic law enforcement and safety in a not yet fully stabilized environment.”⁶ A constabulary force or constabulary-trained force is formed to “create order in an unstable situation while assisting in and encouraging the development of social organization and public attitudes that are conducive to long-term stability.”⁷ Constabulary training encompasses a wide range of missions—crowd control techniques, search techniques and procedures, patrolling, intelligence/information collection, psychological operations, civil affairs activities, treatment and control of refugees/displaced persons, riot control techniques, and area security—among other similar functions.

It is obvious that many of these constabulary missions employ the same tactics and mechanics of combat operations. Nuanced differences reside in the environment wherein they are performed, the rules of engagement employed, and the autonomy afforded junior leaders to carry out these missions. Although these constabulary missions may seem tactically simple and not as intensive as combat operations, they require good leadership, a great deal of maturity and well-honed interpersonal skills of the soldiers, as well as host-country trust and confidence in U.S. officers conducting the operations. But our leaders and soldiers are not institutionally provided the training and tools to determine when to apply or not to apply certain skills or how to respond to varying situations. Our warriors are trained to fight and win our nation’s wars.

This paper challenges the still existing military culture exulting the warrior ethic at the expense of also emphasizing non-combat missions of the U.S. Army as part of a full-spectrum force. This warrior ethic must be modified in order to equip and train units to serve as a truly full-spectrum force. In the content summary of the proposed Field Manual 100-5, offensive and defensive operations are but two of four types of military actions in full-spectrum operations—offensive, defensive, stability, and support. Offensive and defensive operations, on the high end, are well-defined and serve the same purpose, to defeat the enemy. Stability and Support

operations, on the other end of the spectrum, are not as clearly defined.⁸ A constabulary capability is necessary to support full-spectrum operations, especially in peace operations. This paper describes constabulary duties; provides historical examples of effective constabulary operations; proposes enhancement of existing capabilities; and suggests changes in doctrine in order to ensure the Army develops a truly full-spectrum force.

This paper does not enter the debate of whether we should engage in constabulary/peace operations or whether it degrades combat readiness. It assumes that the lawful requirement imposed by the National Command Authority (NCA) to conduct peace operations will continue to require a constabulary capability and thus suggests ways to train for success.

THE CONSTABULARY MISSION IS REAL.

Newspaper articles are replete with examples of soldiers admitting that an operation in Somalia, Bosnia, or Kosovo was not the life they expected when they joined the Army. From the time they graduated boot camp or officer training they were ready to do battle. In their mind's eye, they were trained in armor, infantry, and artillery tactics—not in escorting children to school. Many found themselves neither trained nor equipped to deal with domestic disputes among a foreign civilian populace.

According to the content summary to Army Field Manual 100-5, Operations, the purpose of support operations is to “promote and protect U.S. national interests by influencing political, civil and military environments and by disrupting specific illegal activity.” Support operations “assist foreign and domestic authorities as they prepare for or respond to crises and relieve suffering” until “civil control can be established.”⁹

The Army plays a key role in establishing a rule of law as part of post-conflict military operations other than war. Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 71: *Strengthening Criminal Justice Systems in Support of Peace Operations and Other Complex Contingencies* further legitimizes the U.S. Army’s role in constabulary operations. PDD 71, signed in February 2000, seeks to improve the U.S. government’s capabilities to respond to criminal justice aspects of peace operations and to support the UN and our partners. As a result of this directive, the Army can expect to be involved to a greater extent in the police aspects of peace operations. This PDD calls for fully integrating criminal justice matters with peacekeeping functions and advocates the deployment in peace operations of the “appropriate mix of military and paramilitary forces as well as police and other constabulary units as necessary.”¹⁰

According to PDD 71, US civilian police are recruited and trained by the Department of State, the lead agency, and the Department of Justice to support UN civilian police (CIVPOL)

operations—key to the success of peace operations. CIVPOL then trains selected indigenous personnel to develop and staff judicial, penal, and legal systems in post-conflict areas. CIVPOL monitors this development as well. CIVPOL may also exercise executive authority and be armed in some instances. The Army, with coalition partners, must also be prepared to support CIVPOL with constabulary capability, especially in the interim period between the establishment of a peace operation until CIVPOL is fully functional and also until CIVPOL has assisted the effective functioning of indigenous police capability.

Joint Publication 3-07.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations notes that, “Military support of diplomatic activities improves the chance for success in the peace process by lending credibility to diplomatic actions and demonstrating resolve to achieve viable political settlements. As a part of Peace Operations (Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement Operations), the military may conduct operations in support of diplomatic efforts to establish peace and order before, during, and after conflict.”¹¹ “Lending credibility” and “demonstrating resolve” are political terms, but military resources carry them out. Commanders and their soldiers must be trained to fully understand how they fit in the large picture; otherwise, they may find themselves in an incident with strategic consequences.

The post conflict environment is going to become even more complex for the soldier and leader on the ground. Besides the sensitivities of host nation or disputing parties, leaders and soldiers alike must contend not only with the ever-present nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) but also with other U.S. government agencies, international governmental organizations (IOs), and CIVPOL. After the battle is fought and won or the conflict is contained, it is no longer our battlefield. However, because of the Army’s experience on the ground, its involvement with the people, and the interim security and control measures established—the Army, often part of a multinational force, is integral to the success of future civilian governance which, in turn, helps ultimately to ensure a palatable exit strategy for the military.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON CONSTABULARY OPERATIONS: WE’VE DONE IT BEFORE; WE’LL DO IT AGAIN.

Since the birth of our nation, the Army has responded to small-scale contingencies and peace operations more appropriate for constabulary forces. The military was employed in a constabulary role in Mexico in 1847 and 1848; in the Confederate States during and after the Civil War where the military assisted in the reconstruction of the South; and in the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and Cuba after the Spanish-American War of 1898. The Army was also involved in nation-building activities in the German Rhineland after World War I and in the U.S. sector of

Germany and in Japan after World War II when the Army restored basic civil government as the first phase of post-war reconstruction¹²

Today's forces operate within constrained resources yet must meet burgeoning demands. Since 1990, the U.S. Army has downsized from over one million to 480,000 personnel, yet it has deployed on average one deployment every 14 weeks, compared with one every four years when the Army was 34% larger. Leaders know they must make efficient use of the nation's current forces and equipment. A similar dilemma presented itself to the U.S. Army following WWII. In 1945, President Truman met with increasing demands from the public to bring home its soldiers following a clear victory. America once again turned inward, away from the war in Europe, seeking to rebuild the economy and American homes and families. The mission in Europe, however, was far from over. There were refugees and displaced citizens and destroyed infrastructure. There were no formal, indigenous governments to deal with this issue. The need for order and establishment of rule of law fell squarely on the U.S. Army in the U.S. sectors in Germany and Austria. General Eisenhower decided that the use of nationals of the occupied countries was "impracticable" for the European Theater. The War Department also gave consideration to using foreign nationals to replace U.S. troops. The "willingness" and "capacity" of the liberated nations to assist the U.S. in the occupation of Germany was unknown therefore dismissed.¹³ Eventually, German policemen, carefully vetted, accompanied U.S. constabulary patrols. Forces were returning to the U.S. and the missions in Europe no longer had sufficient support of America's people to allow for a large post-war Army capable of dealing with post conflict/security issues that faced war-torn Europe. The idea of a "super military police force" first surfaced in 1946. Its advocates declared this force would be "elite, well trained, capable of working independently." It was an efficient use of force.¹⁴

Mobile, cavalry-type units were identified as best suited for constabulary duties. They were mature, well-led, and accustomed to working in teams and small organizations independent of the battalion. The U.S. sector was divided into Constabulary Districts, which were supposed to provide prompt notice of incidents to the local Counter-Intelligence Corps detachment, Military Police, or German Civil police--and to take independent action only when no other security agency was available. The District Constabulary was not a Military Police organization, although much of their training was police-related. The District Constabulary was really a mobile reserve of tactical troops, with the following roles and missions:

- Patrol and provide area security
- Search and apprehend wanted persons
- Recover contraband goods

- Assist Counter-Intelligence Corps in apprehending wanted persons
- Gather intelligence
- Provide communications and courier links¹⁵

The U.S. Constabulary School was established in 1946 at Bad Tolz—originally a Hitler Youth School. The U.S. Constabulary used the train-the-trainer method to develop the force. Following the trainers' indoctrination and training, they developed and established an eight-week training program. Individual and collective training included police-type training such as making arrests; elements of crime; laws of arrest; rules of evidence; interrogations, confessions and statements; collection and preservation of evidence; traffic control and accidents; border control. Tactical training included riot duty, raids and searches, guard and care of prisoners, mounted patrols, employment of air liaison sections, security, and the use of Constabulary weapons. In addition to tactical and police training, soldiers received a geopolitical indoctrination to include German psychology and background; German language training; German political parties; international relations; organization, functioning and relationship of the Constabulary to other military agencies.¹⁶

This training program culminated with a series of small-unit field exercises, including raids, border control, sealing off a part of the city, operation of checkpoints, control of riots or disturbances.¹⁷ Military courtesy, discipline, morale, and esprit de corps were emphasized throughout the program as essential in the development of an elite force. Although rules of engagement weren't specifically addressed, soldiers were schooled on the authority of the U.S. Constabulary, Articles of War, Rules of Land Warfare, personal conduct and bearing, organization and responsibilities of military government and of the German government.¹⁸

Consider now what is expected of today's soldier and peacekeeper. Many of the same leadership and soldier attributes, missions and roles, and training requirements identified by leaders nearly 60 years ago are similar if not the same as those desired today. Performing peace support operations, today's full-spectrum soldier--a well-trained, value-based, volunteer--is expected to investigate alleged violations or question suspects; negotiate and mediate; verify disarmament and demobilization; conduct and verify prisoner of war exchanges; provide relief to refugees; restore emergency infrastructure functions; and provide security.¹⁹

Now consider two examples of how training and leadership can affect a unit's success when involved in peacekeeping or peace support operations. One involves an Military Police battalion and the other an Infantry battalion. Both were deployed to Kosovo in support of Task Force Falcon. Doctrinally, the Military Police battalion has an inherent constabulary capability. The infantry battalion, on the other hand, does not. Clearly the MP units are best suited for this

mission. However, because few such units are available, combat units must be specifically trained for this mission. This kind of training has become increasingly necessary, though obviously lacking.

793^d Military Police Battalion: In June 1999, the 793d Military Police Battalion deployed to Kosovo from Germany in support of Task Force Falcon with only 12 days notice. The battalion had elements already deployed in Sarajevo as well as elements deployed in support of Task Force Hawk in Albania. The battalion, despite its short deployment notice, had been readying its subordinate units and was anticipating this type mission. As fate would have it, they had just completed a major training exercise at the MOUT facility in Hammelburg, Germany.²⁰

Paramilitary forces were still operating in the battalion's area of operation in Kosovo. This area included refugees, criminal elements with minefields, and no civil government. The soldiers believed they were performing a "real-life" mission, which validated their military police battlefield functions—Maneuver and Mobility Support Operations, Area Security Operations, Internment/Resettlement Operations, Police Information Operations, and Law Enforcement.²¹ It also validated the battalion's mission essential task list. Although the mission of a military police unit is obviously well-suited for peace operations, focused training and situational training exercises had better prepared the unit for the mission.

Battalion missions included conducting Macedonia Border Control operations and keeping the main supply route clear for KFOR units to move from Macedonia into Kosovo. The unit provided security for facilities and dignitaries, including the President of the United States. MPs provided security for convoys, responded to and investigated mortar attacks, conducted internment operations, and responded to disputes between Serbs and Albanians. Police information collection was critical for regional analysis and intelligence. The battalion commander said that combat arms units were reluctant to share this information with his patrols and tended to be very possessive of the land they occupied and the information they developed.²²

The key support the Military Police provided to Task Force Falcon was law enforcement. "Because of the significant violence in the cases, and the sheer quantity of cases, [criminal investigation division] could not respond to every case." Consequently the military police became investigators. The battalion commander found that MPs lacked basic fundamentals of investigations, so he conducted on-the-job training.²³

The military police were effective in de-escalating disturbances. The battalion commander observed that MPs reduced tensions by using interpersonal communications skills, whereas

combat units tended to use warning shots. Both are effective, but with different results in long-term working relationships with the populace.²⁴

Task Force 3-504: In July 1999, Task Force 3-504, Fort Bragg, received a deployment order for Kosovo with a report date of 9-12 September 1999. The unit had only 26 training days, excluding weekends and block leave. The unit's training guidance was inaccurate and did not reflect the most current training requirements. U.S. Forces Command (FORSCOM) requires FORSCOM units deploying to Peace Support Operations to conduct a Mission Rehearsal Exercise (MRE) which includes detailed classroom and practical training on U.S. Rules of Engagement, along with individual and collective training scenarios appropriate for the specific operational environment.²⁵ The unit's brigade headquarters instead focused on preparing for a JRTC rotation and left the development and execution of the training plan to the battalion commander. Task Force 3-504 had a high intensity focus during pre-deployment. They were prepared for a combat operation.²⁶ Training focused on small-unit infantry tactics, including MOUT training, close quarter battle, react to contact mounted/dismounted, reflexive fire/reflective fire and sniper fire.²⁷

The task force's unstable operating area was similar to the 793d's. There were incidents of Albanian lawlessness directed against Serbs. The unit found itself ill prepared for this type of operation. They had not received any training in crowd or riot control techniques, search techniques and procedures, use of force (ROE), or treatment of detainees. The soldiers of one particular company were involved almost entirely in police operations. The lack of solid, mature leadership at the company level; an uninformed mission focus; inadequate training for the actual mission; and the resulting frustration led to a series of incidents that resulted in an investigation of the task force. Consider these findings:

“..crimes and abuses were the direct result of failures in leadership and a lack of personal discipline...”²⁸ The unit exceeded the scope of their duties. Their unit slogan, “Shoot 'em in the Face” and habit of pointing M-4 carbine weapon systems with attached maglight at locals to illuminate their faces resulted in deteriorating public opinion.²⁹

“Sometimes the tasks are so overwhelming that the soldiers on patrol wind up having to assume the responsibilities of the military policeman on the ground.” BG Sanchez, Commander, Task Force Falcon.³⁰

“...the unit was not trained in law enforcement.” CPT Lambert, Company commander.³¹

"...the training we received prior to this deployment did not prepare us for this mission. When I say that I mean we are not trained to act as police and perform policing duties, such as to detain and question personnel." CSM Flores, battalion Command Sergeant Major.³²

The investigating officer recommended that the Kosovo operation be "reinforced with a greater presence of Military Police and Counter-Intelligence assets, inherently trained on the proper aspects of crowd control, search and interrogation techniques, until the United Nations can provide a more substantial and viable police presence."³³

Unfortunately there are not enough Military Police and Counter-Intelligence assets to meet world-wide needs, let alone those in Kosovo. This is why constabulary training must be implemented at all levels of training for all soldiers involved in peace operations.

It is not enough to rely on the professionalism of our senior non-commissioned officers and officers to ensure soldiers do the right thing in such politically sensitive strategic environments. They too have been raised with a Cold War focus and must go through a peace operations transformation as well. Soldiers will be required to act independently, fairly, and with initiative when necessary in a strategically-charged environment. Soldier training needs to strike a balance between the professional warrior ethic and incorporation of political sensitivities to this demanding, complex global strategic environment.

"Without adequate training and preparation for the unique challenges and dangers of peacekeeping and humanitarian interventions, regular militaries can become demoralized, lose sight of their ultimate mission, and eventually exacerbate the situation they were sent to improve."³⁴ In the 1950s and 1960s, Western militaries that trained for mechanized, massed-forces operations found themselves poorly trained and ill-equipped to engage in guerrilla-type warfare. Even today with the recent investigation into soldier misconduct in Kosovo, inadequate training and leadership shortfalls were cited as reasons Task Force 3-504, Task Force Falcon failed.³⁵

CONSTABULARY PRESCRIPTION: TRAIN FOR SUCCESS, NOT FOR FRUSTRATION

Adequate preparedness for peace operations can lead to "accomplishment of the U.S. mission at a reasonable cost, while lack of preparedness can lead to long and costly commitments, less than complete success and adverse world reactions."³⁶ Combat arms unit commanders who are called upon to support peace operations find themselves trying to articulate, in innovative ways, their unit's METL to convince their soldiers of the relevancy in their assigned missions.

Operations other than war are not new missions. However, they require collective tasks that are unique to peace operations. These tasks should be incorporated into the unit's METL. The first time a unit's leaders and soldiers see those tasks should not be four to six weeks before they deploy. The tasks include but are not limited to:

- Separate belligerents
- Control/disperse crowd
- Apprehend/detain noncombatants
- Control refugee movement
- Conduct cordon and search operations³⁷
- Protect a crime scene.

The key Army role in peacekeeping and humanitarian operations is to provide security and help establish and carry out a rule of law, which are inherently constabulary functions.

In peacekeeping missions from the Balkans to East Timor, establishing basic law and order has been among the most important—and formidable—challenges. Developing effective local police forces, establishing credible court and penal systems, and reforming legal codes can make the crucial difference between building a just future and lapsing back into conflict.³⁸

The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) has, through newsletters and other products, made available to the commanders scheduled to conduct peace operations a means to frame the redeployment and operational training tasks required for the mission. For many soldiers from private to officer, this will be the first time they have been exposed to specific peace operations tasks such as negotiating skills, patrolling, and maintaining law and order.³⁹ Four to six weeks of tailored/specialized training is not enough to change months to years of a general “go-to-war” training mindset.

Post-conflict operations training should not be limited to the unit, staff, and individual levels. Such indoctrination should start at entry-level schools through Non-commissioned Officer Education System (NCOES) and the Officer Education System (OES)—in professional development systems as well as at the unit level. This includes mindset changes from “find, fix and kill” to “minimum use of force, limit collateral damage” under more restrictive ROE.

According to Joint Publication 3-07.3, training for peace operations is a two-prong endeavor. First, professional military education of all officers and noncommissioned officers should include orientations for peace operations. Second, the training of individuals, units, and staff is usually conducted shortly before a deployment. The assumption is that if you are trained for war-fighting you can train for the “specifics of a mission” in a short period of time. But, the

mission is usually not specific. Further, peace operations are usually carried out in teams, not units. U.S. forces conducting peace operations never have the luxury or security of having trained NCOs and officers at every checkpoint, food distribution point, or on every patrol.

Situational training exercises serve to bolster soldiers' confidence in situations requiring greater discipline; it introduces varied levels of rules of engagement or escalation of force. Soldiers can anticipate changes and adjust faster after exposure to this type of training. CALL, in conjunction with the 25th Infantry Division, developed a series of peace operations training vignettes that help a unit preparing to deploy in support of a peace operation. Although developed to assist the 25th ID (LT) in preparing to deploy to Haiti in 1995, the situational training exercises or vignettes contain relatively generic situational events with possible solutions that could be adapted by the unit leader and trainer to prepare his unit for deployment.⁴⁰ Vignettes include this situation: "You are the platoon leader of a search team within a company cordon and search mission"; the event: "You enter the house and someone runs out the back door"; and possible solution: "Report to the company commander, try to provide a description of the individual. Do not pursue the individual; that's the security team's job. An individual leaving the scene of the cordon is not considered a threat, only a suspect. Use of Deadly Force is NOT authorized."⁴¹

The tactics, techniques, and procedures for constabulary missions such as conducting cordon and search operations or crowd control must be taught in situational venues. How soldiers react to crimes in progress (crimes against a person or property) or crowds (angry or jubilant) will determine the level and amount of training required or even identify potential problems.

Peace operations are not scaled-down combat operations in major theaters of war. These very different operations require separate and thorough training and indoctrination. Although mechanically many peace operations tasks are no different than the combat oriented-mission essential task list (METL) related tasks, they require restraint in application and a political/strategic awareness of the environment in which they are applied. This is not fully learned in the four to six weeks or during pre-deployment training--if units are that fortunate enough to have such preparation.

In a series of surveys of Army War College students (1997, 1998, 1999), respondents were asked whether peace operations negatively impacted on combat readiness. A great majority responded that none or few items of their METL included the tasks they needed to conduct assigned peace operations. Forty-one percent, 38 percent, and 37 percent of the respondents, respectively, said peace operations required critical tasks not listed in their unit

METL.⁴² Consequently, they employed an average of four weeks of “ramp up” training programs for those “critical tasks”, or relied on on-the-job training.

The U.S. Army is an extremely professional and adaptive military force. The quality of the soldiers and leaders is second to none in the world. While constabulary operations are not new to the Army, our soldiers often find themselves “winging it” when it comes to conducting peace operations. Combat units don’t habitually train to assist in rebuilding nations, supervising truces, enforcing cease-fires, maintaining public order, disarming and reintegrating forces, unless they are trained in preparation for a specific peace operation.

The major barrier to using traditional military units for peace-keeping or humanitarian operations, however, is that the military leadership of most major powers will not want to devote significant numbers of unique forces, technologies, or doctrines to the problem. Militaries exist to fight and win major wars. To train large numbers of troops in less-intensity combat, such as the riot control and house-to-house searching underway in Somalia, would detract from the military’s capability to perform its primary mission.⁴³

This statement came from interviews with officers at the Pentagon from all services during February and March 1993 while the Somalia operation was ongoing.⁴⁴ Unless the Army culture accepts peace operations as legitimate military operations and develops appropriate doctrine, then trains and equips accordingly, the Army response to such operations will continue to be inadequate, and we will continue to put frustrated and disillusioned soldiers in harm’s way.

Whether peace operations are investments in the future or post-conflict mop-ups, peace operations have become a critical part of a unit’s mission. The time has come to train our soldiers well in the conduct of such operations.

CONCLUSION

“Fighting and winning wars are quite properly the primary functions of the military, but there is a danger if it is perceived to be the only function.”⁴⁵ If individuals don’t get appropriate training at the basic combat training level, officer basic level, and in their units as part of the METL, the first time they may consider how to conduct peace operations may be when they are on the ground trying to mitigate between disputing parties. Soldiers’ institutional and unit training must incorporate the entire spectrum of operations—from combat operations to humanitarian operations. Today’s training is still clearly focused on the high end of the spectrum of conflict: we train and equip our soldiers to fight major wars. We are, however, obviously willing to accept risk at the other end of the spectrum in terms of training and equipping soldiers, for we are not effectively training or equipping our soldiers to conduct operations other than war.

The Army's mission is to not only fight and win our nation's wars but to respond to the lawful requirements imposed by the NCA to conduct peace operations. The National Military Strategy of Shape, Respond, and Prepare should be considered a three-legged stool. To negate or neglect any part of that three-pronged strategy could result in assuming greater risk in the other areas. Without doubt, we do well in training and equipping for the "Responding" and "Preparing". However, we need more preparation for "Shaping."

Risk must be mitigated throughout the spectrum of conflict. A full-spectrum force cannot be an expert in everything, but exposure to and acceptance of peace operations will go a long way in addressing current frustrations in peacekeeping and assuring future success in all operations—across the full spectrum.

WORD COUNT = 5,171

ENDNOTES

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¹⁰ Presidential Decision Directive 71: "Strengthening Criminal Justice Systems in Support of Peace Operations and Other Complex Contingencies, Summary of Directives," available from <http://www.state.gov/www/global/narcotics_law/pp71/summary_directives.html> ;Internet; accessed 12 December 2000.

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¹² Schmidl, 26.

¹³ Major James M. Snyder, The Establishment and Operation of the United States Constabulary, 3 October 1945—30 June 1947 (Historical Sub-section G-3—U.S. Constabulary, 1947), 22.

¹⁴ Ibid., 1.

¹⁵ Ibid., 6.

¹⁶ Ibid., 81.

¹⁷ Ibid., 71.

¹⁸ Ibid., 69.

¹⁹ Colonel Larry M. Forster, "Peace Operations: An Update," p 82 of Volume IV Readings, Course 2: "War, National Policy and Strategy," 23 August—18 October 2000, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050, Department of National Security and Strategy.

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²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ General John W. Hendrix, "Report of Investigation," memorandum for Chief of Staff, US Army, Fort McPherson, Georgia, 6 November 2000.

²⁶ Colonel John W. Morgan, III, "Results of 15-6 Investigation," Executive Summary for Brigadier General Ricardo Sanchez, Camp Bondsteel, Kosovo, 23 January 2000, 7.

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²⁸ Hendrix, 2.

²⁹ Morgan, 99.

³⁰ Ibid., 55.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Ibid.

³³ Ibid., 57.

³⁴ Michael J. Mazarr, "The Military Dilemmas of Humanitarian Intervention," Security Dialogue 24, no. 2 (June 1993): 158.

³⁵ Hendrix, 2.

³⁶ Havoc, vii.

³⁷ Major Chris Hughes, "Forward: Peace Operations Training Vignettes with Possible Solutions," 24 October 2000; available from <http://call.army.mil/call/vignettes/haiti/peactask.htm>; Internet; accessed 21 December 2000.

³⁸ Statement by the President, White House press release, February 24, 2000.
http://www.state.gov/www/global/narcotics_law/pdd_71/000224_president.htm

³⁹ Captain Gary Domke and Jenny Solon, "Operations Other Than War-Volume IV: Peace Operations," 9 October 1997; available from <<http://call.army.mil/call/newsltrs/93-8/chap5.htm>>; Internet; accessed 21 December 2000.

⁴⁰ Captain Gary Domke, "Peace Operations Training Vignettes with Possible Solutions," 16 September 1997; available from <<http://call.army.mil/products/vignettes/haiti/toc.htm>>; Internet; accessed 21 December 2000.

⁴¹ Ibid, vignette 7.

⁴² Lieutenant Colonel Joseph P. Nizolak, Jr., Peace Operations and Their Impact on Combat Readiness, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, July 1999), 8.

⁴³ Mazarr, 157.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 162.

⁴⁵ Antonia Handler Chayes and George T. Raach, eds., Peace Operations, Developing an American Strategy (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1995), 7.

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